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BOOK REVIEW

Monetary Institutions in an Evolving World
JEAN-MARC GOLLIERt
LEGAL

FOUNDATIONS

OF

INTERNATIONAL

MONETARY

STABILITY. By Rosa M. Lastra. Oxford University Press,
2006. Pp. vii, 547. $ 175.00 (hardcover).
INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, too
many people have the impression that global governance is
impossible. They think that anonymous market forces move
throughout the world like swift and invincible Behemoths
compared to nation-states-poor little Leviathans-who
flounder along old-fashioned geographical frontiers as
clumsy and isolated dwarfs. The 1997 Asian financial and
monetary crisis provided a certain confirmation of the
insufficiency of international regulation. Judicial victories
of "vulture funds" ("sovereign pirates")' have seemed to
t Former Assistant Professor, Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium;
Former Corporate Lawyer; Legal Expert, Brussels. This text is a personal
contribution of the author. The opinions expressed herein are that of the author
alone.
1. ROSA M. LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY
STABILITY 477-78 (2006). Lastra provides a clear description and analysis of the
judicial victory of the 'Elliot' private fund against the Peru Brady Plan. Their
victory was based on a 'Blitzkrieg' strategy. Id. The Elliot fund froze Peruvian
accounts by way of a summary procedure before the Brussels Court of Appeal in
2000. Brussels was an appropriate venue because the accounts were under the
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many to be more blows against the hope of an orderly
globalization.
Rosa Lastra's book provides another point of view,
anchored in an international society that has been in the
making since the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944.
In this view, a new world, a more global and yet orderly
world, is slowly taking shape under our eyes, thanks to
relatively silent but effective monetary institutions and
monetary arrangements. No doubt we are far from the
achievement of such a new world. After more than 50 years
of unceasing effort, the construct of an international legal
environment favoring monetary stability is still at the
foundational stage. What about the next 50 years? One
thing is for sure: the End of History2 is not for tomorrow.
Nobody knows what the world will be tomorrow, but it
seems to be full of promises. Still, we must pray that today's
"foundations" of a stable global monetary regime do not
come to appear like the foundations of the gigantic
cathedral in Pisa, Italy, where the pillars are marked on
the ground but the cathedral was never built due to wars,
famine, and the Black Death. Only the transept was
finished; it is nevertheless a marvelous building next to the
leaning Tower of Pisa. The way our monetary environment
has evolved suggests that the necessary structure for a
stable monetary world will be within the sight of the next
generations. Lastra focuses on this evolution and writes
control of Euroclear Bank, in its capacity as operator of the Euroclear System.
See id. Since then, in another case, the same Court of Appeal has reversed its
position. It has refused to freeze accounts of the state of Nicaragua in the
Euroclear System for payment to be made to holders of Nicaraguan "Bonos de
Pago por Indemnizacion." See Republic of Nicaragua v. LNC Investments and
Euroclear Bank S.A., General Docket No. 2003/KR1334 (Ct. App. Brussels, 9th
Chamber, Mar. 19, 2004); see also Georges Affaki & Jean Stouffiet, Chronique
de droit bancaire international [Chronicle of International Banking Right], 101
BANQUE ET DROIT 82-90 (2005) (Fr.); Lee C. Buccheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The
Hunt for Pari Passu, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Feb. 2004, at 20. A Supreme Court
appeal against that last decision has been rejected. Republic of Nicaragua v.
LNC Investments and Euroclear Bank S.A., Cass. 23 Dec. 2005, Arr. Cass.
(unpublished). After these cases, Belgian law has been modified to prohibit such
freezing of assets in the hands of a clearing and settlement institution. Belgian
Law of Apr. 28, 1999 (revised Nov. 19, 2004), http://www.cass.befloi/loi2.htm (on
settlement finality in payment and securities settlement systems).
2. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (1992); cf.
David A. Westbrook, City of Gold: An Apology for Capitalism in a Time of
Discontent (2004) (advocating in favor of a critical acceptance of our time as a
time for global capitalism).
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about what has been experienced in our recent past, what is
presently in place, and what is still under construction.
Lastra's book offers a unique, extremely clear,
and concise description of the legal
documented,
foundations of international monetary stability. Charles
Goodhart writes in his foreword that Lastra's book is "a
major work of serious scholarship. If anyone wants to know
how the legal structures of the world's various overlapping
monetary systems are set up (and how and why) in the first
decade of the twenty-first century, this book is the place to
turn. ' 3 Geoffrey Miller adds yet in another foreword that
"[i]t is destined to be an essential reference for lawmakers,
central bankers, bank regulators, and legal and policy
active
financial
staff
in internationally
planning
4
institutions."
Legal Foundations of InternationalMonetary Stability
is divided into three parts devoted to the analysis and
critical description of the foundations of monetary stability
at (1) the national level (monetary sovereignty, central
banking, banking supervision, management of banking5
crisis, emerging economies); (2) the European Community
level (history of the monetary integration, European web of
monetary institutions, European banking supervision and
crisis management); and (3) the international level (before
and after Bretton Woods, the evolving role of the IMF, the
present and future international financial architecture).
A French literary critic, Maurice Blanchot, writes that
in every successful book there is a convergence point around

3. LASTRA, supra note 1, at ix.

4. Id. at xii.
5. Lastra notes that the terms European Union (EU) and European
Community (EC) are sometimes used indistinctly. 'European Union' was coined
by the Maastricht Treaty (1992). See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 174 n.2. It added
to the existing common policies (mainly economic) an intergovernmental
cooperation in the field of security, justice and home affairs. See id. In the same
treaty, it has been decided that the terms 'European Community' had to replace
the terms 'European Economic Community.' See id. It is perhaps but a detail,
but it is rare to find the explanation. The European Constitution "signed in
Rome on 29 October 2004 was thrown into a legal limbo following the negative
results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005." Id. at xv.
Lastra still refers to that draft text insofar as it shows the direction into which
the European initiative intended to go, even though it does not provide for
fundamental reforms for European monetary issues.
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which the book flourishes.6 In the case of Lastra's book, this
point is in Chapter 13 relating to the law of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (371-445), in which she
describes and comments on the IMF functions (e.g.,
surveillance, financial assistance, and technical assistance).
Her descriptions and comments are rooted in her experience
and her conviction of the usefulness of this institution
which, after each international monetary or financial crisis,
is the subject of intense criticism, yet it rises again from the
ashes like the phoenix.
Lastra worked at the Legal Department of the
International Monetary Fund in Washington D.C. in the
nineties. 7 She saw the break-up of the Soviet Union in
December 1991, as well as the tentative strategy to create
the foundations for a Russian ruble financial market (not to
mention the creation of as many new currencies as there
were new independent states).8 In 1992, she saw the
signing of the Maastricht Treaty regarding the European
Union which, on the existing foundations of the European
"common market," laid down the foundations for a
monetary union. Thus, she has been at the forefront of the
most major developments in the field of monetary law and
practice in the last decade of the twentieth century.
The book provides a brilliant description and analysis of
the national and international monetary stability dilemma,
with, as it is inevitable in the current context, a propensity
to recoup it with the broader problematics of financial
stability.
I will only focus on those aspects of the book that relate
to the interconnections between monetary policy and

6. Maurice Blanchot, L'Espace litt~raire (1955).
7. LASTRA, supra note 1, at xiii. Rosa Lastra is Senior Lecturer in
International Financial and Monetary Law, Centre for Commercial Law
Studies, Queen Mary, University of London. See generally LASTRA, supra note 1.
She is a founding member of the European Shadow Financial Regulatory
Committee, an associate member of the Financial Markets Group of the London
School of Economics, an affiliated scholar of the Center for the Study of Central
Banking at New York University Law School and an observer at the Monetary
Committee of the International Law Association. See id. She has been a
consultant for the IMF, the World Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, the Asian Development Bank, and the UK Treasury select committee. See
id.
8. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 22.
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prudential supervision. Many sensitive financial and
monetary issues which are masterly dealt with in the book 9
will not be reviewed, even though they contribute to making
this book a great introduction, in fact far more than an
introduction, to one of the most striking successes of our
(peacefully) globalizing post-WWII society.
I.

MONETARY SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL SURRENDER

Sovereignty is the power to impose will, or, to speak in
legal terms, to impose law, to decide on content. If you have
the ability to impose your law on subordinates, it means
that you are their sovereign. If in commending subordinates
you must comply with certain rules which are beyond your
control, you are not their sovereign. There is probably
someone above you who exercises sovereign power-who
decides what the law will be. In a market economy, a
fortiori in a globalized market economy, sovereignty is an
eroded concept. It is not so much that there is someone
above any sovereign, but that there are forces and laws of
the market which are recognized-up to a certain extentas sovereign. Our sovereigns (nation states) take the
market phenomenon as a matter of fact, an undisputable
reality. A critical resistance to the idea of market
sovereignty is necessary because markets are not perfect.
Nevertheless, market forces are legitimated-in a
materialist context-by the prosperity they generate. It is
as if God, once exclusive beneficiary of popular reverence,
had finally found a rival: the invisible hand of the market. 10
9. For example, what is a systemic risk? Id. at 138-50; How to deal
internationally with a bank insolvency. Id. at 145 n.120 (Herstat cases); id. at
68 n.85 (BCCI); id. at 128-37 (Banco Ambrosiano, Franklin National Bank);
How did the European Monetary Union develop? Id. at 173-206; How does the
'prohibition of excessive deficits' within the Euro zone work? Id. at 254-58, 26570; How does the IMF contribute to global financial stability not only by way of
financial assistance, but also by way of surveillance? Id. at 398-441, 474-95.
10. At the Age of Enlightenment, the sublime idea appeared that man could
develop autonomy-empowerment-notably thanks to education. See MARIE
JEAN ANTOINE NICOLAS DE CARITAT MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, EsQuISSE D'UN
TABLEAU HISTORIQUE DES PROGRkS DE L'ESPRIT HUMAIN [Outlines of a Historical

Table of Progress of the Human Spirit] (1822). As a consequence of that
autonomy, God has been dethroned. But after two centuries of hesitation,
market forces (governed by the rules of 'freedom,' 'equality,' and
'calculativeness') seem to occupy the terrible throne left free by God. The
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Lastra rapidly recalls the history of the concept of
sovereignty from the French historian Jean Bodin (the
sovereignty of the Monarch) to the French philosopher
Alexis de Tocqueville (the sovereignty of the people) and
passing by Hobbes (Leviathan), Machiavelli (The Prince),
and the Founding Fathers (the sovereign has to ensure
public peace). She does not tackle contemporaneous
hesitations about the concept of sovereignty. Yet,
contemporaneous debates about sovereignty have produced
significant new lights. One of the most striking
developments is offered by German lawyer and fascist Carl
Schmitt (1888-1985), former student of sociologist Max
Weber, who identifies sovereignty as well as the sovereign
is capable of decisive action without other limits like that of
his own will-especially in crisis situations, i.e. in a "state
of exception."'" He powerfully argued against the liberal
idea of 'sovereignty of the people' which would be either an
illusion or a deception. Sovereignty is closely linked with
force and in crisis times, with violence. In that direction,
Tullio Treves considers that "State 'sovereignty' belongs to
the area of fact and not to the area of law... Sovereignty is
seen as a factual situation from12 whose existence
international law draws consequences."'
Lastra recalls the 1929 case before the Permanent
Court of International Justice relating to the "Brazilian and
Serbian loans" according to which "it is a generally accepted
principle that a State is entitled to regulate its own
currency."'1 3 This principle has been significantly eroded,
not so much by market forces than by the development of
international law. Nowadays, it is generally accepted that
monetary regulation is "a matter of international

horizon of 'fraternity' which was the main source of enthusiasm for the French
Enlightenment has vanished and is no more taken au sirieux.Today, fraternity
seems to be reduced to a source of aesthetical satisfaction (about 'solidarity' and
'sympathy,' see WESTBROOK, supra note 2 at 300-01). The ideal of autonomy has
been somewhat tarnished by this mercantile horizon. On 'calculativeness,' see
Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,36 J.
L. & ECON. 453 (1993).
11. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPrERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY (George D. Schwab trans., 2006). Carl Schmitt was a fierce
supporter of Adolf Hitler in the 1930s.
12. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 17 n.43.
13. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 16 n.41.
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interest."'

With a surprising reference to emotions, Lastra states
that "not a tear should be shed about the decline of
monetary sovereignty."'15 If we want to live in a somewhat
stable international environment, there is no doubt that the
nationalistic principle of the "Brazilian and Serbian loans"
case cannot be considered a correct ruling.
The decline of monetary sovereignty is two-fold. On the
one hand, independence of central banks (see below)
16
constitutes an auto-limitation of the state. Like Ulysses
asking his crew to tie him up to the mast to pass by the
sirens' isle, 17 a government surrenders monetary policy to
the central bank.' 8 On the other hand, international
arrangements at the European level (the building of the
1993, and its
since
Monetary Union
European
accomplishment between 12 countries since 1999 - 13
countries since 2007) and the international level (the IMF
Articles of Agreement) constitute a voluntary surrender by
nations of their monetary sovereignty. These structural
arrangements allow nations to better face the considerable
power of markets. Especially in countries where cross-

14. DOMINIQUE CARREAU & PATRICK JUILLARD, DROIT INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIQUE [Economic International Law] 551 (1998); see also Norwegian

Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 37 (July 6) (in which the International Court
of Justice stated that "[tihe question of conformity of national legislation with
international law is a matter of international law"). Rosa Lastra adequately
places in its context this famous case about the question of the international
validity of the "gold clause." See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 25 n.80. Economic
International Law.
15. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 27.
16. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY, Book XII. (George Palmer trans., The
Riverside Press 1884) (c.900 B.C.).
17. About the idea that constraints may serve freedom in case of limited
rationality of the agent, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY (1979); Rosa Lastra-referring to JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 93

(1975)-uses the image of Robinson Crusoe and concludes that "a government,
recognizing its own weakness in the face of temptation, limits itself by allowing
or creating autonomous or independent bodies." LASTRA, supra note 1, at 63.
18. This does not mean that a state where monetary policy has been
entrusted to an independent central bank no longer has monetary sovereignty,
but that such sovereignty is no longer exercised by a political power. As pointed
out by Lastra, this is comparable to the independency of the judiciary. LASTRA,
supra note 1, at 64.
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border capital flows have been liberalized.19
Monetary sovereignty includes (1) the power to issue
coins and notes (ius cudendae monetae); (2) the power to
regulate the use of money and, Lastra adds, 20 to regulate
the banking system; (3) the power to control the money
supply and the interest rates (monetary policy); (4) the
power to control the exchange rate (exchange rate policy);
and (5) the power to impose exchange and capital controls.
The first power (ius cudendae monetary) is one of the
most visible symbols of sovereignty. 21 The second power is
the classical power to legislate. The third and fourth powers
are not really sovereign since they are confronted by market
powers in an open economy. 22 The fifth monetary power is
the only one which allows a state to escape from the
attraction of market forces. The legitimacy
of the use of this
23
last power is, of course, very sensitive.
Central bank independence has generated many
studies and papers. Independence is considered a necessity
to avoid monetary manipulations for electoral purposes 24 as

19. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. c
325, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12002E/pdf/12002EEN.pdf
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. Article 56 of the EC Treaty has obliged Members
States to liberalize capital movements not only between Members States, but
also between Members States and third countries. Id. at 24.
20. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 22. She rightly limits the monetary issue at
stake to the regulation of credit. Indeed, prudential regulation of bank activity
is not per se a monetary issue, even though it is manifestly an issue for the
financial stability problematic.
21. In the synoptic gospels, the demonstration of the distinction to be made
between the sovereignty of God (on souls) and the sovereignty of Cesar (e.g., on
tax matters) is made on the basis of a coin: "Jesus ... said, ' . . . Show me the
coin used for paying the tax.' They brought him a denarius, and he asked them,
'Whose portrait is this?' . . . 'Caesar's,' they replied. Then he said to them, 'Give
to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's."' Matthew 22:18-21.
22. Generally, the central bank manages monetary policy issues, while
exchange rate policy remains in the hands of the government. See LASTRA,
supra note 1, at 57.
23. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 23 n.70. Rosa Lastra observes that for the
time being, and especially in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, there is a "lack of
consensus in the academic literature about the wisdom of capital flows . . . and
the inconclusive evidence." Id. at 398.
24. Devaluation dopes exportation and employment and may artificially
create a sentiment of euphoria. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 45.
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well as to neutralize the abuse of seigniorage. 25 Lastra
brilliantly outlines the current state of academic debates
and proposes her personal point of view on the subject: "As
a practical matter, politics has to play a role in the
activities of central banks: the goal of complete insulation
from politics cannot be realized. '26 She usefully describes
the case of the Bundesbank (originally West Germany's
central bank), whose independence and respectability has
been a model for the European Community. During the
German reunification (3 October 1990), there was a fierce
opposition between the government of West Germany and
the Bundesbank about the rate of exchange for the East
marks against the D-marks. Chancellor Kohl decided for a
parity of one to one. The political decision has been
considered symbolic of the reunification. The question of
price stability was set aside. To combat the inflationary
situation generated by this decision and the "government's
failure to articulate an appropriate fiscal policy," 27 the
Bundesbank was obliged to have a high interest rate policy
in 1992-1993.
Lastra points out that the Bank of England enjoys a
unique situation. Since it is under the Bank of England Act
1998, the monetary objective (inflation target) to be
pursued by the Monetary Policy Committee is specified by
25. Seigniorage is the sovereign power to issue additional money without
justification beyond the sovereign will. It is seen as a kind of tax against holders
of money, since the burden of the additional amount of issued money will be
shared by these people under the form of inflation (loss of value of the
currency). Inflationary finance will generate distrust in the currency even
though, temporarily, it allows the state to avoid the unpopular measure of being
obliged to levy new taxes to meet its own obligations. See LASTRA, supra note 1,
at 54-55.
26. Id. at 53. It is to be noted that central bank independence is considered
required only vis-a-vis the political power. Independence vis-a-vis the market
participants is not a point of concern for central banks, notably because the
central bank is the bankers' bank. For the prudential supervisor, which has
only an administrative relation with banks, the independence vis-a-vis market
participants that are subjects of prudential control is of course a central issue
(as identified notably by the theory of the 'capture'). See LASTRA, supra note 1,
at 101; see also MARC QUINTYN, SILVIA RAMIREZ & MICHAEL W. TAYLOR, THE FEAR
OF FREEDOM: POLITICIANS AND

THE INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF

FINANCIAL SECTOR SUPERVISORS (IMF Working Paper WP/07/25, Feb. 2007). The
risk of capture is one of the reasons why in jurisdictions with a poor experience
of prudential control the empowerment of the central bank is generally the most
efficient solution. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 91.
27. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 60.
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the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 28
II.

CENTRAL BANK ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY

An independent central bank must answer to the
question of democratic legitimacy. The central bank is an
institution within the structure of democratic politics. In
some contrast to the judiciary, a central bank may be
"independent," but nonetheless requires political, in the
narrow sense, legitimacy. 29 Such legitimacy comes from
accountability and transparency in the implementation of
monetary
policy.
Accountability
and
transparency
supplement-and do not replace-trust in the institution.
Accountability can be defined as the obligation to give
account and to justify action. To be effective, accountability
should be related to criteria which set forth the objectives
that the institution must pursue, and for which it must
regularly give account. The most striking example of a list
of criteria in the sector of financial supervision is offered by
the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the U.K. 30
Narrowly defined objectives exemplified by the European
Central Bank (price stability 3 )-compared to the broadly
defined and multi-faceted objectives of the U.S. Federal
Reserve (stable prices, growth, and employment)--clarify
the role of the independent institution but could limit its
room for action and, consequently, its performance.
Seen procedurally, accountability is a matter of periodic
reporting (e.g.: annual report, public hearings), and
openness to public scrutiny. Accountability may also be
seen from an accounting perspective, as literally giving

28. See id. at 71.
29. On the level of the European Union, the OLAF (European Anti-Fraud
Office) case has "clarified the legal position of the European Central Bank.
'[Tihe ECB, pursuant to the EC Treaty, falls squarely within the Community
framework" even though it is not included in the EU's main institutional
framework. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 223. As commented by Rosa Lastra, "[t]he
ECB is . . . a 'special' EU institution . . . 'somehow outside' the core EU
institutional framework." Id. The ECB is independent "within the Community
structure" (not independent from the Community). Id. at 225.
30. See id. at 330. For a recent 'mapping' of independence and accountability
in a set of 32 countries, see QUINTYN, RAMIREZ & TAYLOR, supra note 26.
31. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 215.
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account of one's performance. 32 Such accountability claims
to be more technical than political, and more market-based
than based on democratic processes. Even though it may be
decisively interesting to know the 'performance' of a public
institution (to conduct a "cost-benefit" analysis), there are
33
significant dangers in concentrating on such an approach.
Accountability is closely linked to transparency.
Transparency should be an essential feature of governance
34
in a market economy but transparency is always limited.
Nothing in our acts can be perfectly transparent (only a
vacuum is perfectly transparent). 'Transparency' refers to
clarity in the action, disclosure, and effort to educate the
public for the understanding of the actions of the person
who claims to be transparent.
Accountability and transparency generate significant
costs and mobilize precious forces within the institution.
The balance between silence (essential to ensure efficiency
of certain kind of actions-for example the rescue of a
weakened credit institution or the preparation of a
monetary devaluation) and speech (too often used for
ideological 35 purposes rather than to give account) is
delicate. Effective accountability and transparency are not
matters of mechanical transfer of information. They need
reciprocal confidence and above all, communication with
'variable geometry.' The criterion of such geometry is the
subsistence of adequate public confidence and the
prevention of expectation gaps by differing communications
of information which could influence market stability. The
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) rescue is a
striking example of a relatively silent resolution
of a
possible systemic disruption of financial markets.36
32. See id. at 70.
33. In essence, a public institution acts in the sphere of public goods.
Providing public institutions performance figures is a highly difficult exercise
subject to multiple and unavoidable manipulations. This demarcates the 'AngloSaxon' model that is rooted in figures (more objective and transparent) from the
German/Japanese model that is rooted in personal relations (more subjective
and opaque).
34. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 72-73.
35. On ideology, see infra note 51.
36. All information on the rescue has been provided post facto. For an
account of the LTCM rescue by the injection of $3.625 billion in a couple of days
by the persuasive action of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York against 14
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III. CENTRAL BANK, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL SUPERVISION

The debate about whether banking supervision should
be located inside or outside the central bank is far from
being purely academic. In Europe, the legal framework and
the institutional infrastructure are moving quickly. The
creation of the European Central Bank (ECB) on the one
hand, the will of the European Commission to achieve an
effective internal market for financial services 37 on the
other hand, and the integration of the Eastern countries on
top of that, call for an urgent reconsideration of this
8
debate.3
Bank activity and the management of monetary policies
are closely linked. First, banks create money. When a bank
provides a loan to a client, most of the time, the bank does
not deliver bank notes to its client. The bank writes the
amount lent on his current account and the client uses the
amount credited to make payments via wire transfers.
In order to conduct monetary policy, central banks are
interested in knowing how much money is generated
outside the issued paper money (fiduciary money) for
monetary policy purposes. Second, the interest rate paid on
a banking loan is, to a certain extent, linked to the interest
rate fixed by the central bank for refinancing operations
(the central bank as bank of banks). Third, in case of a
crisis, a bank which faces temporary liquidity difficulties
might be rescued by its central bank, acting as lender of
last resort (LOLR).
Banking supervisors have another role to play:
prudential regulation of the bank activity. Their acts and
the focus of their attention are significantly different. In the
major banks involved in that accident, see, e.g., ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN
GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000);
GARRY J. SCHINASI, SAFEGUARDING FINANCIAL STABILITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE,

(2006); David Shirreff, Lessons from the Collapse of Hedge Fund, Long-Term
Capital Management, The Institute of the
Chief Risk
Officers,
http://riskinstitute.ch/146480.htm.
37. As initiated by the EU Commission with the Financial Services Action
Plan. See The EU Single Market, The Financial Services Action Plan (1999),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/finances/actionplan/indexen.htm.
38. See

THE

REGULATION

OF

INTERNATIONAL

FINANCIAL

MARKETS:

PERSPECTIVES FOR REFORM (Rainer Grote & Thilo Marauhn eds., 2006). Most of
the contributions included in this book where delivered during a workshop
which took place in 2001.
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regulation of the banking industry, banking supervisors are
principally interested in knowing whether the bank will
have a problem reimbursing its depositors. Deposits are
short-term liabilities while loans are long-term, illiquid
bank assets. In addition, the provision of loans necessarily
includes a certain degree of risk. Bank supervisors will
verify that the risks are under control, that they are not too
concentrated or provided to related parties. The interest
rate must be consistent with the necessity for the bank to
generate revenues to survive in the long-run. These
preoccupations differ significantly from those of monetary
policy makers whose first objective is to ascertain control
over the flow of money held and generated by banks.
There is at least one situation where, as a matter of
necessity, prudential regulators and the monetary policy
makers need to act together-when they are embodied into
separate institutions. This is when a bank has such severe
liquidity difficulties that on the one hand there is a risk of a
bank run,39 and on the other hand there is a risk of
definitive inability of the bank to reimburse its depositors.
The central bank may in such a case offer a solution in its
capacity as lender of last resort. 40 The prudential
supervisor may take administrative measures (injunction,
prohibition, administrative penalty, appointment of a
provisional administrator, etc.) to limit the damages and,
eventually, to put in place a rescue operation.
The significantly different angles of approach of the two

39. Bank runs are a consequence of panics caused by a sudden-and often
irrational-loss of confidence. The risk of bank runs, which is a consequence of
panics, is currently significantly diminished by the existence of a deposit
insurance scheme. The legitimacy of such a scheme in a market economy is
indisputable, but it has to be properly framed to avoid 'free riders' and 'moral
hazard.' See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 124-28.
40. Lastra provides an extremely clear description of the LOLR intervention
going back to the still valid, first analyses of this problematic, by Thornton in
1802 and Bagehot in 1873, and the last developments with the amendments to
the Federal Reserve Act in 1991, to require more accountability from Fed
management when it decides to act as LOLR. In effect, at the end of the
operation, if the bank is unable to reimburse the loan, (a part) of the burden of
the insolvency will be born by the taxpayers. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 11320. On the LOLR problematic at the European level, see id. at 303-07; see also
WHICH LENDER OF LAST RESORT FOR EUROPE? (C.A.E. Goodhart ed., 2000)
(explaining that in a market economy, the burden of insolvency is borne by the
creditors of the insolvent business).
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authorities (monetary on the one hand, prudential 4 l on the
other hand) create diverging analysis and different actions.
The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)
case offers a caution against giving the same person
authority for prudential supervision and monetary
functions. 42 The insolvency of a bank is always a risk for the
reputation of the supervisor and is in practice unavoidable.
As pointed out by Lastra, citing Charles Goodhart, "the
conduct of supervision is a thankless task... [a] supervisor is
only noticed when he/she angers the regulated by some
restrictive or intrusive action, or when supervision fails in
the sense that a financial
institution collapses or a
43
customer gets ripped off."
On the other hand, in the case of separation of
monetary and supervisory functions, there is no doubt that
the absence of strong and efficient communication between
the supervisor and the central bank may be the cause of
significant malfunctioning of the global prudential
system-whose fundamental purpose is financial stability.
A remarkable institutional arrangement, on which Lastra
insists, is the U.K. 'Standing Committee' which is intended
41. Prudential supervision' may be defined as the action by which the
prudence of a person is assessed and controlled. It comprises surveillance of the
existence of one's own sufficient funds to absorb eventual losses resulting from
the risks taken in the business, the existence of an adequate organization, the
fit and proper character of the management, the effectiveness of internal control
mechanisms and of an internal audit department, and the compliance with
codes of conduct in the relation of the bank with its clients, etc. The supervisory
process implies transmittal of periodic accounting reports by the supervised
entity to the supervisor, meetings to discuss attention points, and on-site
inspections.
42. Notably, see Mads Andenas, Liability for Supervisors and Depositors'
Rights - The BCCI and the Bank of England in the House of Lords, EUREDIA
2000/3 (commenting under the decision of the House of Lords, Three Rivers
District Council v. Governor and Company of the Bank of England). The
judgment of the House of Lords is available at http://www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/ldl99900/ldjudgmt/jdOO0518/rivers-I.htm. As mentioned by
Rosa Lastra, the case was abandoned on 2 November 2005, when BCCI
liquidators dropped their claims (for an amount of £850 million) after receiving
a legal ruling by the court supervising the liquidation that "it would not be in
the best interest of BCCI's creditors to continue with the lawsuit." LASTRA,
supra note 1, at 103 n.57. The Bank of England subsequently introduced a
claim for the costs incurred in that lawsuit and eventually recovered more than
£70 million by way of settlement with the liquidators. See BCCI Costs, Bank of
England, June 7,2006, httpJ/www.bankofenglanctco.uk/publicationsnews2006/064.htm.
43. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 101.
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to intervene before any lender of last resort operation or,
more generally, in the case of a financial instability risk.
This Committee includes representatives from the Central
bank (Bank of England), the Treasury/Ministry of Finance,
and
the
supervisory
agency
(Financial
Services
Authority).44 Lastra considers that such a Committee
should exist at the European level- the occurrence of a
pan-European banking or financial crisis being less and less
hypothetical with the progressive achievement of the
internal market for financial services. She considers that in
addition to these three parties, a representative of the
competition directorate of the European Commission should
also be present, since a rescue operation may imply
injection of public money into a private business to possibly
create an unfair competitive advantage. 45 In the EU, the
second 'Brouwer report' has stressed the need to better
coordinate financial crisis management at the EU level. 46
Two other issues are presently contested in Europe:
first, whether to establish a single regulatory authority for
bank, insurance, and financial services; and second,
whether the time is ripe to centralize prudential control in
the hands of a single European supervisor. Lastra rightly
points out that the empowerment of a single authority in
Europe to exercise prudential supervision would require a
Treaty change. Alternatively, to increase the power of the
various advising institutions which were created in the
wake of the Lamfalussy report 47 (Committee of European
Securities Regulators for securities markets; Committee of
European Banking Supervisors for credit institutions; and
Committee of European Insurance and Occupational
Pensions Supervisors for insurers and pension funds) in
order to centralize prudential control under their leadership
44. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 96, 314.
45. Id. at 311-15. As explained by Rosa Lastra, under EU regulation, even
though the banking sector is specifically regulated-creating barriers to the
entry and limitations to the free exercise of business-it is subject to
competition regulation. Id. at 121-22.
46. See ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE, ECON. PAPER No. 156, REPORT
ON FINANCIAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT (2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/

economy-finance/publications/economic-papers/2001/ecpl56en.pdf.
47. The Committee of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise
Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets (2001), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal-market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/finalreport-wise-men-en.pdf.
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would probably not be easier to accomplish because
increasing the power of these existing institutions would
also require a new surrender of national sovereignty. Thus,
even if the perpetuation of the present decentralized
structure of prudential supervision in a monetary union
and in an effective European single market is,
intellectually, not satisfactory, it may be perfectly
justifiable on an historical basis.
IV. MONETARY INSTITUTIONS, TRANSITION ECONOMIES,
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, AND POVERTY

In each part of her book, Lastra devotes one chapter, or
several sections, to an analysis of the financial and
monetary questions linked to development or transition
economies. In part one, chapter five relates to "Monetary
and Financial Law Reform in Emerging Economies" (151170). In part two, a section relates to the European Union's
'Structural Funds' on behalf of less-developed regions of the
EU (272-273). In part three, reflections
on these themes
48
come back at the end of each chapter.
A lot has been written about "transition economies" and
the manner in which they may find their way to becoming
market economies. The least that can be said is that, for the
time being, these economies have not enjoyed a pleasant
route. They have had to swallow bitter medicine to
approximate
market economies
and a democratic
organization. Profound foundations have to be built on the
sand of exhausted collective economies. But does anyone
know what a well-organized market economy is? Does
anyone know what a well-functioning democracy is? Is
there anyone who can make a pure, 'ideology-free'
48. Citing the words of Henri Morgenthau at the opening of Bretton Woods
in 1944: "Poverty, where it exists, is menacing to us all and undermines the
well-being of each of us. It can no more be localized than war." LASTRA, supra
note 1, at 370. Section H ("The Evolution of IMF Financial Facilities and
Policies") of chapter thirteen ("The Law of the International Monetary Fund") is
mainly dedicated to financial assistance for low-income countries. Section D of
the last chapter (chapter fourteen: "International Financial Architecture") is
dedicated to sovereign debt crisis and the role of the IMF as well as providing
an interesting definition of an 'insolvent country': it is a country "that cannot
pay its debts, not because it has insufficient assets but because it cannot
mobilize the revenues required to service its debt without imposing great pain
to its citizens, jeopardizing the survival of its government and impairing the
social and political stability of the country itself." LASTRA, supra note 1, at 474.
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presentation of the answers to these questions?
The most striking fact, from our Westerners' point of
view, is the tenacity with which many intellectuals in the
old collective economies work on the building of their
societies-doing their best to employ the political, economic,
financial, and monetary tools, and to put in place suitable
regulations. Sometimes, they seem to have more rigor than
we have. Other times, they seem to have more hope in the
future than we have. But their environment too often
presents a daily struggle against corruption, dependence,
lack of experience, lack of competitiveness, and lack of legal
foundations.
The IMF has invested substantial energy and expertise
to assist the development, of solid monetary and financial
foundations for 'transition economies', and closely follows
their development as the numerous 'Article IV' reports
published on the IMF website illustrate. The IMF often has
the role of an educator (in the etymological meaning of the
person who "makes grow outside the field of infancy").
Education is not in fashion nowadays, especially with
the younger generation. The educator is suspected of
oppression or abuse against ignorant subjects. He is
suspected of trying to impose his unique way of thinking. It
is in such a negative atmosphere that the so-called
"Washington Consensus" 49 has been debated, mostly on
Latin-American IMF 'conditional' financial assistance.
As pointed out by Lastra, the (short) history of IMF
assistance to developing countries may be viewed as having
50
experienced a pendulum move between current ideologies.
49. John Williamson coined the expression, without knowing that it would
be the rallying cry of anti-globalization demonstrators. See, e.g., John
Williamson, Speech at the Center for Strategic & International Studies: Did the
Washington Consensus Fail? (Nov. 6, 2002) (outline of speech available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=488).
The
'Washington Consensus" is often associated with the neo-liberal agenda. See, e.g.,
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 74 (2002).
50. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 156 (citing Jeswald W. Salacuse, The Legal
Architecture of Emerging Markets, in THE REFORM OF THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE 48, 49 (Rosa Lastra ed., 2001).

The concept of 'Ideology' has a negative connotation as a consequence of a
curious but nearly universal contamination by the Marxist use of the concept.
This is the result of confusion, as the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur
demonstrated, PAUL RICOEUR, LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (1988),
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The history of IMF assistance to developing countries may
be divided into three models. Between the 60s
(decolonization) and the beginning of the 80s (the ThatcherReagan years), development was centered upon public
ordering, reliance on public sector enterprises, and
relatively closed economies ('Model 1'). Model 1 was
disappointing in various ways, and a new model emerged
('Model 2') with four characteristics: (1) reliance on market
forces, (2) privatization, (3) deregulation, and (4) openness
to foreign investments. This Model is identified with the
"Washington Consensus." The imperfections of this Model
have made it unsatisfactory. Market forces left to
themselves in developing countries tend to create suboptimal equilibria. A 'Development Model 3' has not
emerged, which seeks to combine in a subtle manner public
and private intervention. Lastra explains, in a very
convincing manner, the patient development that should
unfold. First of all, an adequate legal framework must be
put in place, which must be 'owned' by the country itself.51
following the analysis of Clifford Geertz. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Ideology as a
Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 193 (1973). Any action in
the public sphere is unavoidably ideologically tainted, which means that behind
the action, there is an engagement with the ideal organization of society as it
can be symbolically designed. There is no doubt that the actions of the IMF has
been, is, and will be ideologically oriented-i.e. that it will embody societal
symbols shared by those who promote IMF action or, to speak in philosophical
terms, IMF praxis. This does not mean that the IMF has been captured by one
side against the other or, to take the words of the Soviet Finance Minister in
1947, that "the Bretton Woods Institutions were merely 'branches of Wall
Street' . . . 'subordinated to political purposes which make it the instrument of
one great power." LASTRA, supra note 1, at 354 n.38. The fact that IMF action is
ideologically tainted only means that the IMF is not a natural object (see in that
respect, the idea that monetary stability cannot be achieved by way of purely
mechanical operation, id. at 53, where Rosa Lastra rightly writes that "[a]s a
practical matter, politics has to play a role in the activities of central banks").
The IMF takes decisions, provides judgments, and proposes orientations which
are not the pure product of abstract spirits but which are the result of the
combination of expertise and judgment oriented towards what they think is the
common good or, to be more accurate, which conforms to the purposes for which
the IMF was created. As noted in Article I of the IMF's Articles of Agreement
that provides the IMF objective: "to promote [] monetary cooperation,"
"balanced growth of international trade," "high levels of employment,"
"exchange rate stability," etc. Id. at 374.
51. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 159. She comes back with the important
concept of country "ownership" when she discusses the 'conditionality' of certain
kinds of financial assistance granted by the IMF to its members, especially in
developing countries. Id. at 412-27, 423. About the creation of regional
groupings, which certainly offers one of the most interesting perspectives of
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Concurrently, a strong administrative apparatus ('public
institutions') must be built to regulate sensitive areas. On
top of that, an efficient and independent judicial system
must be created or reinforced. This entire system must be
developed in the context of a market economy in-themaking, of course.
In any event, IMF assistance to developing countries is
not a part of its core business. Theoretically, the IMF has
only accessory competence in the field of development. Such
a competency had initially been entrusted to the World
Bank. As the "Meltzer Report" 52 implicitly pointed out, the
tendency of public institutions is to broaden their area of
activities rather than to narrow it (what the report calls
"mission creep"), whatever the reason is for such a
53
tendency.
Henry Morgenthau, in the opening remarks at the 1944
Bretton Woods conference, declared that "Poverty, where it
exists, is menacing to us all and undermines the well-being
of each of us." Lastra, citing this declaration, considers that
development for less developed countries, Rosa Lastra cites the twentiethcentury Spanish philosopher, Ortega y Gasset, who stated that 'a nation is a
unity forged in history, with a common destiny."' Id. at 205-06. She comments
that:
Though he had in mind the nation state, the idea of a 'common destiny' is a
useful motto . . . to integration .... the single most important obstacle that

developing countries face in their pursuit of effective integration is the lack of
the necessary institutional and legal mechanisms to achieve the objectives of
regional []and monetary integration.
Id. at 206.
Lastra points out that countries which want to develop state-of-the-art
legislation "need to understand that if it engages five sets of foreign advisors,
they will propose five different laws, which will be inconsistent with each other
and with the country's existing laws." In order to limit that hazard, "local
draftsmen need to be closely involved in the drafting process." Id. at 165 n.42
(citing Bernard S. Black, The Legal and InstitutionalPreconditionsfor Strong
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 847-49 (2001)).
52. See INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTION ADVISORY COMMISSION
REPORT (2000), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm. This
report is cited once by Lastra. See LASTRA, supra note 1, at 418.
53. Be it because they have personal interests to be kept in charge of
something rather than nothing or because they have the sentiment of a duty to
do so in order to fill in a gap in the public area. An analytical approach would
nonetheless disqualify any justification tainted with sentiments. This is, in my
opinion, the most common mistake we are ideologically conditioned to do these
days.
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these words "still resonate" and "seem appropriate to
describe the challenges that the IMF and the international
currently face and are likely to face in years to
community
54
come."
CONCLUSION

Lastra does not provide an 'economic analysis of law.'
As she points out, not only has each discipline developed its
own language, making it a more or less impenetrable
bastion for experts or specialists, but also too many
international institutions, in their admirable propensity to
try to achieve their goals, have created a series of concepts
55
that nobody other than their own servants understand.
Yet economics and law are inextricably linked in any
approach to monetary questions. Lastra, as a lawyer, never
loses her reader in the sometimes arcane language of legal
specialists. One of the most striking results she achieves is
to provide, in a succinct amount of pages (500), a clear
picture of most of the monetary questions that are presently
discussed. She exposes how a central bank should organize
the safety-net resulting from its role as lender of last resort
(LOLR) and how it must limit moral hazard. She explains
the complex birth of the European Monetary Union (EMU)
and the paradoxical situation of such a unique monetary
Union within Europe which is still decentralized with
regard to fiscal, prudential, and even most of its economic
policies. She recalls with luminous details the miraculous
reunification of Germany in 1990, upon a political decision
of Chancellor Helmut Kohl against the will of the
Bundesbank. She provides an extremely useful insight of
the history, present multi-faceted activity, and perspectives
of the IMF.
I have centered my review on some of these issues,
treating them from a rather abstract perspective. Perhaps
it is naive, but I enjoyed reading the book because Lastra
has manifested the will to share her deep understanding
and her beliefs in the legal foundations of monetary
stability which are probably, as stated at the beginning of
this review, only at a preliminary stage of development.

54. LASTRA, supra note 1, at 370.
55. About the IMF "clouds of specialized terminology," see id. at 385.
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It is easier to write history long after the events. Lastra
tells us a story which is in the making. In telling this story
with the right words, she helps us understand what is
happening, and helps us invest our trust in its proper
achievement, in so far as an achievement may be awaited.
As George Steiner stated in an interview: of course Jewish
believers think that the Messiah will come, but some of
them-who have a certain pleasure in living their lifehope that He will not come too soon, because once he
arrives, the56 story will be achieved, which is not really what
they want.
There is no doubt that monetary stability, as well as
financial stability, will remain challenging in the coming
decades. There is no doubt that the institutions created
sixty-years ago face significant criticism in that respect and
have manifest weaknesses which will have to be cured in
the coming years. There is no doubt that one of the most
urgent cures is education-more people being made aware
of the efforts which are being made to favor peace and
prosperity in the world. I am of the opinion that with her
latest book, Lastra provides a significant and academically
impeccable contribution to that end.

56. See GEORGE STEINER & ANTOINE SPIRE, BARBARIE DE L'IGNORANCE (1999).

